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Abstract
I will focus my contribution on two distinct limitations on the Commision’s investigative
rights in competition proceedings: (i)legal professional privilege ; and (ii) the privilege against
self-incrimination. My intervention is divided into two sections. The first section describes the
evolution of these two privileges and their current scope. The second section focuses on the issues
raised by the application of legal professional privilege and the privilege against self-incrimination
within the framework of Regulation No. 1/2003.
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PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
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INTRODUCTION
In 1989, my former colleague David Edward delivered a bril-
liant speech at the Fordham conference about "Constitutional
Rules of Community Law in EEC Competition Cases."' He con-
cluded by noting that "the number of competition cases in
which the Court [of Justice of the European Communities] has
sustained an argument based on fundamental rights is very small
indeed," but that it was not "too late to bring out the big guns of
constitutional artillery. "2
Fifteen years later, following substantial modifications of the
enforcement scheme of European Community ("EC") competi-
tion law, it remains interesting to inquire how the "big guns"
have shaped EC competition law and, in particular, whether
their number and range have somehow evolved.
In that regard, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that
the fundamental-rights artillery has developed and evolved sub-
stantially over the years. The rhetoric of fundamental rights, or
principles, in competition cases pervades a significant number of
areas such as the rights of the defense, the prohibition of double
jeopardy, and the prohibition of arbitrary and disproportionate
investigations.' However, given that the theme of this confer-
ence is "Rights, Privileges and Ethics in Competition cases," I will
focus my contribution on two distinct limitations on the Com-
mission's investigative rights in competition proceedings: (i) le-
* President of the Court of First Instance of the European Communities. The
views expressed are entirely personal. They endeavor to set out the law as it stands on
September 27, 2004. I would like to thank Eric de La Serre, refrendaire in my chambers,
for his assistance with the preparation of this Article.
1. David Edward, Constitutional Rules of Community Law in EEC Competition Cases, in
ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORDHAM CORPORATE LAw INSTITUTE 383 (Barry Hawk ed.,
1990).
2. Id. at 418.
3. See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, arts. 48, 50, O.J. C
364/01 (2000).
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gal professional privilege; and (ii) the privilege against self-in-
crimination.
These two privileges have, indeed, much in common:
* at the EC level, both are judicial creations; they were es-
tablished and developed by the Court of Justice ("ECJ")
and the Court of First Instance ("CFI"); 4
* both aim, inter alia, at protecting the rights of the de-
fense;5
* both have experienced important evolutions since they
were established;6 and
* last but not least, their application within the enforcement
scheme created by Regulation No. 1/20037 vividly illus-
trates several intricacies of that regulation.8
My intervention is divided into two sections. The first sec-
tion describes the evolution of these two privileges and their cur-
rent scope. The second section focuses on the issues raised by
the application of legal professional privilege and the privilege
against self-incrimination within the framework of Regulation
No. 1/2003.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF LEGAL PROFESSIONAL PRJVILEGE
AND THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
This Section will first describe the initial legal framework as
set out in Regulation No. 17/62 ("Regulation No. 17").' It will
then focus on the development of legal professional privilege
and the privilege against self-incrimination under EC law.
A. The Initial Situation Resulting from Regulation No. 17
When Regulation No. 17 was adopted in 1962, it vested the
Commission with investigation powers that were much less im-
pressive than those enjoyed by the federal authorities of other
jurisdictions ° (e.g., the United States, where the investigating
4. See AM&S Europe Ltd. v. Commission, Case 155/79, [1982] E.C.R. 1575, 18-
28.
5. See id. 20.
6. See infra notes 27-132 and accompanying text.
7. Council Regulation No. 1/2003, OJ. L 1/1 (2003).
8. See id.; see also infra notes 155-80 and accompanying text.
9. Council Regulation No. 17/62, 13J.O. 204 (1962), oJ. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1959-62,
at 87.
10. See id. arts. 11, 14, OJ. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1959-62, at 90-91.
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authorities may in certain circumstances use the investigation
powers attached to criminal offenses 1 ). However, despite these
differences, the powers enjoyed by the Commission were not in-
significant, as illustrated, in particular, by the Commission's
power to send requests for information and to perform investiga-
tions without a warrant of judicial authority. 12 The significance
of the Commission's powers was enhanced by the relatively short
catalogue of rights explicitly conferred by Regulation No. 17 on
the undertakings subject to investigation.'" In brief, it can be
recalled that the Deringer Report (which was prepared in the
course of the consultation of the Parliament on the adoption of
Regulation No. 17) had proposed that Regulation No. 17 in-
clude a right not to be forced into self-incrimination and a right
to lawyer-client confidentiality. 4 However, the final version of
Regulation No. 17 adopted by the Council did not provide for
such rights. Regulation No. 17 merely provided for: (i) the un-
dertakings' right to be heard on the matters to which the Com-
mission had objected before the adoption of certain decisions;' 5
11. See Federal Trade Commission, Office of the General Counsel, A Brief Overview
of the Federal Trade Commission's Investigative and Law Enforcement Authority (revised Apr.
1998), available at http://library.lp.findlaw.com/articles/file/00002/001995/title/Sub-
ject/topic/Antitrust%20and%20Trade%20RegulationStatutes/filename/antitrustand-
traderegulation_2_229.
12. See Council Regulation No. 17/62, supra note 9, arts. 11, 14, O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed.
1959-62, at 90-91.
13. See id. arts. 19-20, O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1959-62, at 92-93.
14. See Rapport fait au nom de la Commission du marche interieur ayant pour objet la
consultation demande d l'Assemble parlementaire europienne par le Conseil de la Communaute
economique europenne sur un premier rglement d'application des articles 85 et 86 du traitM de la
C.E.E. (Doc. 104/1960-1961), 30:
[Clette rglementation ne correspond pas en plusieurs points aux principes ggneraux en
vigueur dans un Etat fonde sur la lUgalit.6 ce qui fait que le reglement risque detre
annule par la Cour de justice. . . . Il conviendrait . . . de preciser que seuls les
proprietaires ou les reprisentants lMgaux des entreprises interpellges sont tenus defournir
des renseignements. En tout cas, toutepersonne tenue defournir des renseignements doit
avoir le droit de refuser le temoignage tout comme le secret professionnel, par exemple des
avocats et des experts-comptables, doit tre garanti.
For the history and the aftermath of the Deringer Report, see Opinion of Advocate Gen-
eral Darmon, Orkem v. Commission, Case 374/87, [1989] E.C.R. 3283, 3301, 90-91.
15. Article 19 provided that the undertaking concerned was entitled to make
known in writing, and, if appropriate, orally its views on the objections raised against
them. See Council Regulation No. 17/62, supra note 9, art. 19, O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1959-
62, at 92-93; see also Hoffmann-La Roche v. Commission, Case 85/76, [1979] E.C.R 461;
Musique Diffusion Franfaise & Others v. Commission, Joined Cases 100-103/80, [1983]
E.C.R. 1825.
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and (ii) the right to judicial review of certain decisions. 6
Despite the explicit acknowledgment of a right to be heard,
one point perhaps overlooked by the Council was that, as a gen-
eral matter, the exercise of significant powers during prelimi-
nary investigations can create occasions of irreparable impair-
ment of the rights of the defense. Such irreparable harm may
occur, for instance, when an undertaking is prevented from
showing, when exercising its rights of the defense at a later stage
of the procedure, that the information collected during the in-
vestigation has not the incriminating meaning that seemed obvi-
ous at the time of the investigation.1 7 This may be the case espe-
cially when undertakings or persons are led to make admissions,
whether justified or not, under psychological pressure or
through fear of being fined if they do not speak.1 8 That may also
be the case if an undertaking is bound to provide information
that it had itself produced for the purpose of preparing its de-
fense, e.g., information forwarded to an attorney.
Accordingly, Regulation No. 17 could appear somewhat in-
complete in that it acknowledged the existence of the rights of
the defense after the sending of a statement of objections but
did not provide for the safeguards that could prevent prior irrep-
arable impairment of these rights at the investigation stage.19
Faced with this apparent inconsistency, the ECJ found sev-
eral rights enjoyed by the undertakings before the formal exer-
cise of their rights of the defense (i.e., before a statement of ob-
jections is served upon the undertaking).2o
16. In particular decisions ordering investigations (Article 14(3)); and decisions
requesting information (Article 11 (5)). See Council Regulation No. 17/62, supra note 9,
arts. 11(5) & 14(3), O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1959-62 at 90, 93.
17. See K.P.E. Lasok, The Privilege against Self-Incrimination in Competition Cases, 11
EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 91 (1990).
18. The use of pressure may also jeopardize the reliability of the information col-
lected:
[W]here the undertakings or persons being investigated are in reality inno-
cent, there is a risk that ingenious questioning will lead less sophisticated re-
spondents to make seemingly inculpatory statements, or, in situations of on
the spot oral questioning where psychological or physical pressure is created
or felt, the individuals questioned may end up making untruthful inculpatory
statements so as to escape from the pressure.
W.P.J. Wils, Self-incrimination in EC Antitrust Enforcement: A Legal and Economic Analysis,
26(4) WORLD COMPETITION 567, 584 (2003). See also Lasok, supra note 17, at 90-91.
19. See Council Regulation No. 17/62, supra note 9, 0.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1959-62.
20. For a general presentation of the "finding" of these rights, see Edward, supra
note 1.
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An important step in this direction was taken in the National
Panasonic (UK) Ltd. v. Commission case, 21 in which the ECJ inter-
preted Article 14 of Regulation No. 17 by reference to the princi-
ples laid down in Nold KG v. Commission.22 In Panasonic, the ECJ
chose to apply the principles set down in Article 8(2) of the Eu-
ropean Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms of November 4, 1950 ("European Con-
vention") .23 As a consequence, although the ECJ ruled against
the applicant in this specific case, 2 4 it expressed its general deter-
mination to apply certain procedural safeguards in the context
of competition investigations.25 Panasonic therefore actually set
the stage for the explicit acknowledgment of (i) legal profes-
sional privilege and (ii) a qualified privilege against self-incrimi-
nation in competition investigations. The rise and development
of these two rights will be analysed in the two following sections.
B. The Development of Legal Professional Privilege in EC Law
In spite of the Council's refusal to provide for an express
statutory acknowledgment of legal professional privilege, some
members of the European Parliament apparently refused to sur-
render. In 1978, the Commission was asked by a Member of the
21. Case 136/79, [1980] E.C.R. 2033, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. 169.
22. Case 4-73, [1974] E.C.R. 491, 13. In Nold, the European Court of Justice
("ECJ") ruled that fundamental rights formed an integral part of the general principles
of law, the observance of which the ECJ ensures, in accordance with constitutional tra-
ditions common to the Member States and with international treaties on which the
Member States have collaborated or of which they are signatories. See id.
23. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 312 U.N.T.S. 221, art. 8(2). See Panasonic, [1980] E.C.R. at
2058, 19, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. at 186 (holding that Article 8(2) of the European Con-
vention for the Protection of Human Rights ("European Convention") defines the con-
ditions in which interference with the rights expressed in Article 8(1) of the European
Convention (the right to respect for one's private and family life, home, and correspon-
dence) is possible). Pursuant to Article 8(2), such interference is possible if it "is in
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the pre-
vention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protec-
tion of the rights and freedom of others." Id. 19.
24. Having found that the aims of the investigative powers of the Commission
under Regulation No. 17 were to contribute "to the maintenance of the system of com-
petition intended by the Treaty which undertakings are absolutely bound to comply
with," the ECJ ruled that Regulation No. 17 did not infringe the right to respect for
private and family life, home and correspondence. Panasonic, [1980] E.C.R. at 2058,
20, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. at 186.
25. See id.
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European Parliament to specify its stance as regards the protec-
tion of legal papers.26 In its answer, the Commission stated that
even though Regulation No. 17 did not provide for any protec-
tion for legal papers, "the Commission ... follows the rules in
the competition law of certain Member States and is willing not
to use as evidence of infringements of the Community competi-
tion rules, any strictly legal papers written with a view to seeking
or giving opinions on points of law to be observed or relating to
the preparation or planning of the defence."2 7 The Commission
further stated that "[s]ubject to review by the Court of Justice, it
is for the Commission to determine the nature of a given pa-
per. "28
The Commission's official stance was not sufficient to settle
the issue: four years later the question of legal professional privi-
lege was raised before the ECJ in the seminal AM&S Europe Ltd.
v. Commission case.29 AM&S was the first case in which the ECJ
had to decide whether and how legal professional privilege ap-
plied in EC law.
In order to answer this question, the ECJ decided to ex-
amine the national laws of the Member States. The ECJ found
common ground in these national laws to the extent that they
protect the confidentiality of written communications between
lawyer and client provided that, on the one hand, such commu-
nications are made for the purposes and in the interests of the
client's rights of the defense and, on the other hand, they ema-
nate from independent lawyers who are not bound to the client
by a relationship of employment.3" The ECJ further specified
that: (i) the confidentiality covered all written communications
exchanged after the initiation of the administrative procedure
under Regulation No. 17 as well as earlier written communica-
tions having a relationship to the subject-matter of that proce-
dure;3" (ii) the independent lawyer involved could be any lawyer
26. See Written Question No. 63/78 by Mr. Coust6 to the Commission of the Euro-
pean Communities, O.J. C 188/30 (1978).
27. Id. at 31.
28. Id.
29. Case 155/79, [1982] E.C.R. 1575. The significance of the issues raised by the
case is illustrated by the fact that two different opinions were delivered before the ECJ
gavejudgment. See Opinion of Advocate-General Warner, id. at 1619; see also Opinion of
Advocate-General Slynn, id. at 1642.
30. See AM&S, [1982] E.C.R. 1575, 21.
31. See id. 23.
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entitled to practice his or her profession in one of the Member
States.2 Finally, the ECJ established certain rules of procedure
that had to be followed by the Commission when faced with a
claim of legal professional privilege.33
Eight years later, in Hilti Aktiengesellschaft v. Commission, the
CFI slightly broadened the scope of legal professional privilege
by making it clear that in view of its purpose the principle must
be regarded as extending also to "the internal notes which are
confined to reporting the text or the content" of written commu-
nications between lawyer and client.34
While the scope of legal professional privilege as defined in
AM&S and Hilti attracted much criticism, 35 until recently there
were no major developments concerning this question before
the EC Courts.
In 2003, however, Akzo Nobel Chemicals and Akcros Chem-
icals filed a case that raises very interesting issues concerning the
scope of legal professional privilege.3 6 As the case is currently
pending before the CFI, I will not make any comments on it. Let
me, however, explain some of the issues raised by the case and
put them into perspective.
This case originated in a Commission investigation carried
out at Akzo Nobel Chemicals' and Akcros Chemicals' premises
32. See id. 25.
33. See id. 11 29-31. In substance, the ECJ ruled that an undertaking that claims
legal professional privilege is to provide the Commission's authorised agents with rele-
vant materials of such a nature as to demonstrate that the communications fulfil the
conditions for being granted legal protection, although it is not bound to reveal the
contents of the communications in question. See id. 29. The ECJ added that where
the Commission was not satisfied that such evidence had been supplied, it was for the
Commission to order, pursuant to Article 14(3) of Regulation No. 17, production of the
communications in question and, if necessary, to impose on the undertaking fines or
periodic penalty payments under that regulation as a penalty for the undertaking's re-
fusal either to supply such additional evidence as the Commission considers necessary
or to produce the communications in question whose confidentiality, in the Commis-
sion's view, is not protected in law. See id. 31. Finally, the ECJ ruled that the interests
of the undertaking concerned were safeguarded by the possibility of obtaining an order
suspending the application of the decision which has been taken, or any other interim
measure. See id. 32.
34. Order of the Court of First Instance (Second Chamber) of 4 April 1990, Hilti
Aktiengesellschaft v. Commission, Case T-30/89, [1990] E.C.R. 11-163, 18.
35. See, e.g., Theofanis Christoforou, Protection of Legal Professional Privilege in EEC
Competition Law: The Imperfections of a Case, 9 FoRmHa INT'L L.J. 1 (1985).
36. See Akzo Nobel Chemicals & Akcros Chemicals v. Commission, Cases T-125 &
T-253/03, O.J. C 146/42, 239/20 (2003) (CFI, pending).
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in February 2003. 7 During this raid, the Commission copied a
number of documents.38 Akzo Nobel Chemicals and Akcros
Chemicals claimed privilege over two different sets of docu-
ments. 9 First, they alleged that a first set of documents had
been prepared in the framework of a compliance program and
should be considered as privileged.4 ° Second, they contended
that a second set of documents comprised drafts of the docu-
ments of the first set as well as correspondence with in-house
lawyers and should therefore also be considered as privileged.41
However, the Commission officials who conducted the in-
vestigation decided on the spot to join the second set of docu-
ments to the file and to put the first set in a sealed envelope
which they brought back to the Commission.42 The Commission
then adopted a formal decision that the two sets of documents
were not covered by legal professional privilege.43 Akzo Nobel
Chemicals and Akcros Chemicals challenged this decision
before the CFI.4 4 They also filed a request for interim measures
under Articles 242 and 243 of the EC Treaty.45 The request
sought, in substance, an order (i) preventing the Commission
from opening the sealed envelope containing the first set of doc-
uments and (ii) enjoining the Commission from using the sec-
ond set of documents (which had already been joined to the
file).46
In the order issued on the request for interim measures, it
was considered that it could not be excluded that the two sets of
documents at stake in this case were privileged.47 First, it could
not be precluded that the first set of documents (allegedly pre-
pared in the framework of a compliance program) was privi-
leged because, prima facie, there was reason to conclude that
working or summary documents prepared by an undertaking for
37. See Akzo Nobel Chemicals & Akcros Chemicals v. Commission, Joined Cases T-
125 & T-253/03 R (CFI, not yet reported).
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See Akzo Nobel Chemicals & Akcros Chemicals v. Commission, Joined Cases T-
125 & T-253/03, O.J. C 146/42, 239/20 (2003) (CFI, pending).
45. Akzo, Joined Cases T-125 & T-253/03 R, 14-17.
46. See id. 1-16.
47. See generally Akzo, Joined Cases T-125 & T-253/03 R.
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the purpose of the exercise of the rights of defense by its lawyer
might be covered by professional privilege.
Second, the second set of documents (containing drafts of
the documents of the first set as well as correspondence with in-
house lawyers) mainly raised the question of whether, in spite of
earlier case-law, correspondence with in-house counsel was privi-
leged.49 It must be emphasized that, in this specific case, the
lawyer involved was a member of the Dutch bar employed by the
undertaking on a permanent basis. Accordingly, the lawyer con-
cerned was subject to certain rules of professional ethics.
Had it been decided to rely on AM&S only, the correspon-
dence with this lawyer would have clearly been unprivileged, be-
cause, in AM&S, the ECJ had excluded correspondence with in-
house lawyers from the scope of legal professional privilege.5"
However, it was considered in Akzo Nobel Chemicals & Akcros
Chemicals v. Commission that the solution in AM&S was based,
inter alia, on an interpretation of the principles common to the
Member States dating from 1982.51 It was further concluded
that the evidence produced in the case tended to show that the
position in the legal orders of the Member States had changed.52
In particular, it could not be excluded that there was no longer
"presumption that the link of employment between a lawyer and
an undertaking will always, and as a matter of principle, affect
the independence necessary for the effective exercise of the role
of collaborating in the administration of justice by the courts."55
It could not be excluded either that independence could be as-
sured where "the lawyer is bound by strict rules of professional
conduct, which, where necessary, require that he [or she] ob-
48. See id. 104. This conclusion was based on the idea that if, in the context of
competition investigations, the Commission were able to copy working or summary doc-
uments prepared by an undertaking solely for the purpose of the exercise of the rights
of defence by its lawyer, the consequence might prima facie be an irremediable impair-
ment of the rights of defence of that undertaking. For an early consideration of this
question, see J. Joshua, The Element of Surprise: EEC Competition Investigations under Article
14(3) of Regulation 17, 8 EUR. L. REv. 3, 17 (1983) ("[i]n fairness ... documents con-
cerned with the preparation of the firm's bona fide defence should not be examined by
the Commission. It would be otherwise where the firm had decided to deceive the
Commission by putting up a colourable defence").
49. See Akzo, Joined Cases T-125 & T-253/03 R, 9 115-130.
50. See AM&S Europe Ltd. v. Commission, [1982] E.C.R. 1575, 27.
51. See Akzo, Joined Cases T-125 & T-253/03 R, 122.
52. See id. 124.
53. Id. 126.
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serve the particular duties commensurate with his [or her] sta-
tus."
54
The order therefore considered that it could not be ex-
cluded that the documents contained in the two sets were actu-
ally covered by legal professional privilege.5' However, as ex-
plained below, interim relief was not granted for all these docu-
ments.
As regards the first set of documents, since the Commission
had not opened the sealed envelope yet, it was considered that it
was urgent to prevent the Commission from doing so.56 Since
the balance of interests tipped in favor of interim relief, the arti-
cle of the decision by which the Commission indicated that it
would open the sealed envelope containing the first set of docu-
ments was suspended. 7 However, as regards the second set of
documents, which had already been joined to the file, it was con-
sidered that, even assuming that it was privileged, the harm suf-
fered by the applicants was already irreparable and therefore did
not justify any interim measure.58
The Commission and Akzo Nobel Chemicals filed an appeal
54. Id.
55. As regards the procedure applicable to a claim of privilege, it was ruled that, in
light of the procedural principles developed in AM&S, it could not be precluded prima
fade that the "Commission's officials must refrain from casting even a cursory glance
over the documents which an undertaking claims to be protected by professional privi-
lege, at least if the undertaking has not given its consent." Id. 139.
56. For that purpose it was considered that the fact that the Commission would be
unable to use the documents as evidence if the decision was declared unlawful would
have no impact on the serious and irreparable harm which would result from their
mere disclosure, since the
purpose of professional privilege is not only to protect a person's private inter-
est in not having his rights of defence irremediably affected but also to protect
the requirement that every person must be able, without constraint, to consult
a lawyer .... That requirement, which is formulated in the public interest of
the proper administration ofjustice and respect for lawfulness, necessarily pre-
supposes that a client has been free to consult his lawyer without fear that any
confidences which he may impart may subsequently be disclosed to a third
party.
Id. 167.
57. See id. 1 190.
58. It is not for the judge hearing an application for interim measures to adopt
measures designed to make up for harm which is already irreversible. Order of the
President of the Court ofJustice in Austria v. Council, Case C-445/00 R, [2001] E.C.R. I-
1461, 113). It must also be stressed that, in its observations, the Commission had
undertaken not to allow third parties access to the litigious documents. See Akzo, Joined
Cases T-125 & T-253/03 R, 176.
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against the order. 9 On September 27, 2004, the President of
the ECJ found that the condition relating to urgency was not
satisfied. Accordingly, the President annulled the order.6 °
It would be of course inappropriate for me to make specific
comments concerning questions on the substance of which the
CFI will have to rule on shortly. Let me, however, make one very
general comment about the Akzo case. As has already been sug-
gested elsewhere, 6 whatever the outcome of this case may be in
the main action, it illustrates the potentially evolutionary nature
of certain rights. Indeed, while undertakings undergoing com-
petition investigations should certainly not hope that the scope
of their rights will evolve at will, there is no reason to believe that
once the scope of a right is set, it will remain cast in stone for
ever. The evolutionary nature of these rights seems indeed par-
ticularly logical when they are rooted in the national laws of the
Member States: these laws evolve, and so does the number of
Member States. As a consequence, the evolutionary nature of
such rights, although it does not necessarily materialise often, is
nonetheless inherent in the EU legal system.
In addition, even when a right is not rooted in the national
laws of the Member States, the increasingly pervasive influence
of the European Convention creates additional leeway for evolu-
tion. As will be shown in the following section, the evolution of
the privilege against self-incrimination illustrates the instrumen-
tal role played by the European Convention in this field.
C. The Evolution of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
As noted above, Regulation No. 17 did not provide for any
59. See Commission v. Akzo Nobel Chemicals & Akcros Chemicals, Case C-7/04
P(R) (ECJ, not yet reported).
60. In substance, the President of the ECJ ruled that the condition relating to ur-
gency was not satisfied in view of the Commission's undertaking not to allow third par-
ties to have access to the Set A documents and of the impossibility of the Commission
using those documents as evidence if the decision were held to be unlawful. The Presi-
dent of the ECJ judged that since the Commission's officials had already examined,
albeit cursorily, documents in Set A during the investigation, the harm which might
possibly result from a more detailed reading of those documents was "not sufficient to
establish the existence of serious and irreparable harm, since the Commission is pre-
vented from using the information thus obtained." Order of the President of the ECJ,
Commission v. Akzo Nobel Chemicals & Akcros Chemicals, Case C-7/04 (P) R, 40-44
(ECJ, not yet reported).
61. See P.J. Slot, A View from the Mountain: 40 Years of Developments in EC Competition
Law, 41 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 443, 448 (2004).
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right against self-incrimination. It was not until 1989, when the
Orkem v. Commission case was decided, that the ECJ was required
to decide whether such privilege nonetheless existed.6 2 As ex-
plained below, Orkem and its progeny have sparked intense de-
bate about the rationale and the scope of the privilege against
self-incrimination.
The first part of this section will describe the principles set
out in Orkem. The second part will present the evolution of the
case-law of the European Court of Human Rights ("ECtHR") on
this topic. The third section will describe the increasing influ-
ence of the ECtHR case-law.
1. The Initial Principles Set Out in Orkem
The applicant in Orkem was an undertaking that challenged
a request for information made pursuant to Article 11 of Regula-
tion No. 17. The undertaking contended that several questions
asked by the Commission infringed "the general principle that
no one may be compelled to give evidence against himself."63
The applicant submitted that the principle was supported by
three different legal bases: (i) the laws of the Member States;
(ii) the European Convention and (iii) the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights of December 19, 1966 ("Inter-
national Covenant"). 64
The ECJ examined each of the three legal bases relied upon
by the applicant. First, the ECJ noted that, "in general, the laws
of the Member States granted the right not to give evidence
against oneself only to a natural person charged with an offence
in criminal proceedings. ' 65 By contrast, there was no principle
common to the laws of the Member States which allowed legal
persons to claim a right against self-incrimination in the context
of alleged infringements in the economic sphere.6 6
Second, the ECJ considered that, although Article 6 of the
European Convention "may be relied upon by an undertaking
subject to an investigation relating to competition law, . .
neither the wording of that article nor the decisions of the
62. See Orkem v. Commission, Case 374/87, [1989], E.C.R. 3283.
63. Id. 18.
64. 999 U.N.T.S. 71.
65. Orkem, [1989] E.C.R. 3283, 29.
66. See id. 29; see also Opinion of Advocate-General Darmon, id. 98-121.
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[ECtHR] indicate that it upholds the right not to give evidence
against oneself."67
Third, the ECJ considered that the right not to give evi-
dence against oneself or to confess guilt upheld by Article
14(3) (g) of the International Covenant "relate [d] only to per-
sons accused of a criminal offence in court proceedings and thus
ha[d] no bearing on investigations in the field of competition
law."
68
Accordingly, the ECJ ruled that none of the legal bases re-
lied upon by the applicant were an appropriate basis for the
right invoked.69 However, the ECJ went on to examine whether
certain limitations on the Commission's powers of investigation
were "implied by the need to safeguard the rights of the defense
which the [ECJ] has held to be a fundamental principle of the
Community legal order."7 ° In that regard, the ECJ found that
the Commission was "entitled ... to compel an undertaking to
provide all necessary information concerning such facts as may
be known to it and to disclose to the Commission, if necessary,
such documents relating thereto as are in its possession, even if
the latter may be used to establish . the existence of anti-com-
petitive conduct."'"
On the other hand, the ECJ also made it clear that the Com-
mission "may not, by means of a decision calling for information,
undermine the rights of defence of the undertaking con-
cerned."7 2 The ECJ went on to explain that "the Commission
may not compel an undertaking to provide it with answers which
might involve an admission on its part of existence of an infringe-
ment which it is incumbent upon the Commission to prove."7 "
Accordingly, the principles laid down in Orkem protected under-
takings against self-incrimination only to the extent that replying
to questions would result in an actual admission."4
The scope of the principle was further delimited three years
67. Orkem, [1989] E.C.R. 3283, 1 30.
68. Id. 1 31; see also Opinion of Advocate-General Darmon, id. 1 127.
69. See Orkem, [1989] E.C.R. 3283, 1 29-31.
70. Id. 11 32-33.
71. Id. 1 34.
72. Id. 34.
73. Id. 35 (emphasis added).
74. See also Socit6 GCn~rale v. Commission, Case T-34/93, [1995] E.C.R. 11-545,
75; Lasok, supra note 17, at 91.
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later in Otto v. Postbank, a case in which the ECJ ruled that the
privilege against self-incrimination could not be claimed in the
framework of national civil procedures applying Articles 81 EC
and 82 of the EC Treaty before a court, since civil proceedings
cannot lead, directly or indirectly, to the imposition of a penalty
by a public authority.
75
2. The Evolution and the Influence of the ECtHR Case-Law
The solution in Orkem was based, inter alia, on the idea that
neither the wording of Article 6 of the European Convention
nor the decisions of the ECtHR indicated that it upheld the right
not to give evidence against oneself.76 However, in a series of
cases decided shortly after Orkem, the ECtHR considered that the
privilege against self-incrimination formed part of the notion of
a fair procedure under Article 6 of the European Convention.
The first step in that direction was the Funke v. France case.7 7
That case originated in a complaint by a French citizen against
France. French custom officers had searched Mr. Funke's home
and asked him to produce statements concerning foreign bank
accounts. Mr. Funke was fined, pursuant to the French Customs
Code, for refusing to provide the statements. 78 The ECtHR con-
sidered that: "the customs secured Mr. Funke's conviction in or-
der to obtain certain documents which they believed must exist,
although they were not certain of the fact. Being unable or un-
willing to procure them by some other means, they attempted to
compel the applicant himself to provide the evidence of offences
he had allegedly committed."79 The ECtHR concluded that
"[t]he special features of customs law ... cannot justify such an
infringement of the right of anyone 'charged with a criminal of-
fence,' within the autonomous meaning of this expression in Ar-
ticle 6 [of the European Convention], to remain silent and not
to contribute to incriminating himself."80
Accordingly, not only did the ECtHR consider that Article 6
75. See Otto v. Postbank, Case C-60/92, [1993] E.C.R. 1-5683, 17.
76. See Orkem, [1989] E.C.R. 3282, 30. The ECJ was aware of the decision of the
Commission of Human Rights in Funke. See Opinion of Advocate-General Darmon, id.
133.
77. [1993] Eur. H.R. Rep. 297.
78. See id. 9-11.
79. Id. 44.
80. Id.
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included some kind of a privilege against self-incrimination, but
moreover it found that this privilege applied to incriminating
documents (and not only to admissions),." Thus, the ECtHR
adopted a stance that is much more far-reaching than that of the
ECJ in Orkem."2
This trend continued in the Murray v. United Kingdom and
Saunders v. United Kingdom judgments, both delivered in 1996.3
In Saunders, the ECtHR ruled, on the one hand, that "[t] he right
not to incriminate oneself is primarily concerned . . .with re-
specting the will of an accused person to remain silent." 4
Therefore, "it does not extend to the use in criminal proceed-
ings of material which may be obtained from the accused
through the use of compulsory powers but which has an exis-
tence independent of the will of the suspect such as, inter alia,
documents acquired pursuant to a warrant, breath, blood and
urine samples and bodily tissue for the purpose of DNA test-
ing." 5 On the other hand, the ECtHR also ruled that the right
not to incriminate oneself "cannot reasonably be confined to
statements of admission of wrongdoing or to remarks that are
directly incriminating. '"86 The ECtHR further noted that
"[t]estimony obtained under compulsion which appears on its
face to be of a non-incriminating nature - such as exculpatory
remarks or mere information on questions of fact - may later be
deployed in criminal proceedings in support of the prosecution
case, for example to contradict or cast doubt upon other state-
81. The inclusion of potentially incriminating documents into the scope of the
privilege against self-incrimination was confirmed in substance 8 years later in JB. v.
Switzerland, [2001] Eur. Ct. H.R. 320.
82. For a criticism of the principles laid down in Funke, see G. Stessens, The Obliga-
tion to Produce Documents Versus the Privilege against Self-incrimination: Human Rights Protec-
tion Extended Too Far?, 22 EUR. L. REV. 45 (1997). Three years after Funke, in John Mur-
ray, the European Court of Human Rights ("ECtHR") specified that "[a]lthough not
specifically mentioned in Article 6 of the [European] Convention, there can be no
doubt that the right to remain silent under police questioning and the privilege against
self-incrimination are generally recognised international standards which lie at the
heart of the notion of a fair procedure under Article 6. By providing the accused with
protection against improper compulsion by the authorities these immunities contribute
to avoiding miscarriages of justice and to securing the aim of Article 6." Murray v.
United Kingdom, [1996] 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 29, 60, 45.
83. See generally Murray, [1996] 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 29; Saunders v. United Kingdom,
[1997] 23 Eur. H. R. Rep. 313.
84. Saunders, [1997] Eur. H.R. Rep. at 314, 69.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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ments of the accused or evidence given by him during the trial
or to otherwise undermine his credibility. 8 7
As the protection granted by the ECtHR in these cases went
far beyond the protection against actual admissions, they raised
the question of whether the limitations set out in Orkem were still
good law.88 In Mannesmannr6hren-Werke v. Commission, however,
the CFI adopted a fairly skeptical stance on this issue.8 9 In this
case, the applicant submitted, inter alia, that, based on Funke, the
scope of the privilege against self-incrimination as laid down by
the ECJ in Orkem had to be broadened. °0 In response to this
plea, the CFI recalled that it had no jurisdiction to apply the
European Convention when reviewing an investigation under
competition law, inasmuch as the European Convention as such
is not part of EC law.9 ' The CFI, however, stated its classic stance
that (i) the ECJ and the CFI draw inspiration from the constitu-
tional traditions common to the Member States and from the
guidelines supplied by international treaties for the protection
of human rights on which the Member States have collaborated
and to which they are signatories; and (ii) the European Con-
vention has special significance in that respect.9 2 Applying these
principles to the facts of the case, the CFI considered that the
privilege against self-incrimination was not absolute, as such a
solution "would go beyond what is necessary in order to preserve
the rights of defence of undertakings, and would constitute an
unjustified hindrance to the Commission's performance of its
duty."9' 3 As a consequence, an undertaking in receipt of a re-
quest for information pursuant to Article 11(5) of Regulation
No. 17 could be recognised as having a right to silence "only to
the extent that it would be compelled to provide answers which
might involve an admission on its part of the existence of an
infringement which it is incumbent upon the Commission to
87. Id. (emphasis added).
88. See, e.g., W. van Overbeek, The Right to Remain Silent in Competition Investigations:
The Funke Decision of the Court of Human Rights Makes Revision of the ECJ's Case Law Neces-
sary, 15 EUR. COMPETITION L. REv. 127 (1994).
89. See Mannesmannr6hren-Werke v. Commission, Case T-112/98, [2001] E.C.R.
11-729.
90. Id. 36-38.
91. Id. I9 59 & 75 (citing Mayr-Melnhof v. Commission, Case T-374/94, [1998]
E.C.R. 11-1751, 1 311).
92. Mannesmannrdhren-Werke, [2001] E.C.R. 11-729, 1 60.
93. Id. 66.
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prove," 4 which in practice confirmed the limits laid down in
Orkem.
Mannesmannrhren-Werke could be interpreted as a signal to
the effect that the EC Courts' interpretations of certain rights in
competition proceedings did not have to coincide exactly with
those of the ECtHR when the latter deals with criminal proce-
dures involving natural persons. However, as explained below,
the EC Courts have recently showed that they were inclined to
make these interpretations converge.
3. Recent Signs of Change in the EC Courts' Case-Law
The first sign of change came from the ECJ in 2002. In the
appeal of Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij & Others v. Commission
("PVC If'), the ECJ explained in very explicit terms that it was
ready to analyse the privilege against self-incrimination based on
the ECtHR case-law."5 In the case before the CFI,9 6 Limburgse
Vinyl Maatschappij ("LVM") and DSM NV and DSM Kunststof-
fen BV ("DSM"), had submitted that the Commission should not
have used allegedly incriminating answers given by any of the
undertakings fined by the Commission (and not only their own
answers) under any legal basis (i.e., either under Article 11 (1) or
under Article 11(5) of Regulation No. 17).1 7 LVM and DSM
contended that Article 6 of the European Convention, as inter-
preted by the ECtHR (relying on Funke and Saunders), laid down
a right to remain silent and in no way to contribute to one's own
incrimination, without any distinction being made according to
the type of information requested (including documentary
form)."9 In its judgment, the CFI started by restating the Orkem
principles. 9 The CFI then found that the questions contained
in the decisions requiring information, and which were chal-
lenged by the applicants, were identical to those annulled by the
ECJ in Orkem and that they were therefore unlawful. '00 However,
the CFI also pointed out that the undertakings had either re-
94. Id. 67 (citing Orkem v. Commission, Case 374/87 [1989] E.C.R. 3283, 35).
95. Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij & Others v. Commission, Joined Cases C-238,
244, 245, 247, 250-52, 254/99, [2002] E.C.R. 1-8375, It 274-77'[hereinafter PVC II].
96. Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij & Others v. Commission,Joined Cases T-305-07,
313-16, 318, 325, 328, 329, 335/94, [1999] E.C.R. 11-931.
97. See id. 429-35.
98. See id.
99. See id. 449.
100. See id. 451.
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fused to answer those questions or denied the facts on which
they were being thus questioned, which meant that the illegality
of the questions could not affect the legality of the decision by
which the Commission had fined them.1 "1 The CFI added that
requests for information under Article 11(1) of Regulation
No. 17 did not contain any element of compulsion and therefore
could not warrant a claim of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. 10
2
On appeal, LVM and DSM contended before the ECJ that,
in its judgment, the CFI had ruled to the same effect as the judg-
ment in Orkem, thereby affording lesser protection to that right
than resulted from recent developments in the case-law of the
ECtHR °3 In its ruling on this ground of appeal, the ECJ, like
the CFI, did not examine whether an undertaking has standing
to raise another party's privilege against self-incrimination. 10 4
Instead, the ECJ first noted that, on the one hand, the CFI had
not reiterated "the finding . . . of the Orkem judgment that
neither the wording of Article 6 of the [European] Convention
nor the decisions of the [ECtHR] indicate that that article
recognises any right not to give evidence against oneself."10 5 On
the other hand, the CFI had uphe.d other principles laid down
in the Orkem judgment.10 6
Having summarized the main findings of the CFI, the ECJ
found that there had been considerable evolutions in the case-
law of the ECtHR since Orkem "which the Community judicature
must take into account when interpreting the fundamental
rights."'0 7 However, the ECJ made the crucial judgment that
"both the Orkem judgment and the recent case-law of the
[ECtHR] require, first, the exercise of coercion against the sus-
pect in order to obtain information from him, and, second, es-
tablishment of the existence of an actual interference with the
right which they define."1 0' Having defined these two condi-
tions, the ECJ considered that, examined in the light of that
101. See id. 7 452-53.
102. See id. It 455-57.
103. See PVC II, [2002] E.C.R. 1-8375, 263.
104. See id. 270.
105. Id. 271.
106. See id. 272 (referring to the principles set out in Paragraphs 27, 28, 32-35 of
Orkem v. Commission, Case 374/87" [1989] E.C.R 3283).
107. Id. 274.
108. Id. 275.
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finding and the specific circumstances of the case, the ground of
appeal raised by the applicants "[did] not permit annulment of
the contested judgment on the basis of the developments in the
case-law of the [ECtHR].°
For that purpose, the ECJ first considered that the CFI had
correctly drawn the appropriate distinction between (i) a simple
request for information, which left the undertaking the possibil-
ity not to reply; 10 and (ii) a decision requiring information
(pursuant to Article 11(5) of Regulation No. 17), which addi-
tionally subjected an undertaking to a penalty in the event of a
refusal to reply: only the latter exerts actual compulsion on the
recipient undertaking." I
Second, as regards requests pursuant to Article 11(5) of
Regulation No. 17, for which an element of compulsion exists,
the ECJ observed that "LVM and DSM did not indicate any as-
pects of those answers which were in fact used to incriminate"
them or the addressees of the requests. 12 The ECJ therefore
deemed it unnecessary "to rule on the question whether the CFI
had erred in law in holding ... by reference to the Orkemjudg-
ment, that such decisions are illegal only in so far as a question
obliges an undertaking to supply answers leading it to admit that
there has been an infringement." '13
Three comments can be made about the PVC II case. First,
the ECJ and the CFI made the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion dependent on an element of compulsion or coercion.1 4
This requirement is perfectly in line with the rationale of the
privilege, because coercion is the main element that may induce
a person (including an innocent one) to make statements that
would seem primafacie incriminating and on which he will not be
able to cast a new light at later stages of the proceedings. 5
Second, the ECJ very explicitly emphasized the relevance of
the case-law of the ECtHR for the purpose of interpreting funda-
mental rights. 16 This stance contrasts with previous statements
109. Id. 276.
110. See id. 279.
111. Id.
112. Id. 289.
113. Id. 292.
114. Id. 275-76.
115. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
116. See id. 274.
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to the effect that the interpretations of fundamental rights by
the EC Courts did not have to coincide exactly with those of the
ECtHR.' 17 This stance is also in line with (i) a more general
trend of the EC Courts to rely extensively on the case-law of the
ECtHR 118 and (ii) the express reference by the Charter of Fun-
damental Rights to the case-law of the ECtHR. 19 Beyond ques-
tions of legal consistency, such convergence is recommendable
for one additional reason: in a case before the ECtHR, an un-
dertaking argued that certain of its obligations under EU law in-
fringed the European Convention. 120 Additional convergence of
117. See, e.g., Opinion of Advocate-General Darmon, Orkem v. Commission, Case
374/87, [1989] E.C.R. 3283, 139-40. Advocate General Darmon writes:
the existence in Community law of fundamental rights drawn from the Euro-
pean Convention does not derive from the wholly straightforward application
of that instrument as interpreted by the Strasbourg authorities .... This Court
may... adopt, with respect to provisions of the Convention, an interpretation
which does not coincide exactly with that given by the Strasbourg authorities,
in particular the [ECtHR]. It is not bound, in so far as it does not have system-
atically to take into account, as regards fundamental rights under Community
law, the interpretation of the Convention given by the Strasbourg authorities.
Id.
118. For example, in a recent case, the ECJ interpreted a directive almost exclu-
sively in light of the ECtHR case-law on Article 8 of the European Convention. Oster-
reichischer Rundfunk & Others,Joined Cases C-465/00, C-138, 139/01, [2003] E.C.R. I-
4989, 1 73, 77, 83).
119. See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Recital 5, O.J. C
364/01 (2000). Recital 5 states in relevant part: "[t]his Charter reaffirms, with due
regard for the powers and tasks of the Community and the Union and the principle of
subsidiarity, the rights as they result, in particular, from.., the case-law of the Court of
Justice of the European Communities and of the European Court of Human Rights" (em-
phasis added). Article 1-9 of the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe
provides that "[t]he Union shall recognise the rights, freedoms and principles set out in
the Charter of Fundamental Rights." Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Eu-
rope, Dec. 16, 2004, O.J. C 310/1 (2004) (not yet ratified). Pursuant to the same provi-
sion, it is planned that the Union will accede to the European Convention.
120. See DSR Senator Lines (EU), Application No. 56672/00. DSR Senator Lines'
application must be analysed against the recent case-law of the ECtHR according to
which
acts of the EC as such cannot be challenged before the [ECtHR] because the
EC is not a Contracting Party. The [European] Convention does not exclude
the transfer of competences to international organisations provided that Con-
vention rights continue to be "secured." Member States' responsibility there-
fore continues even after such a transfer.
Matthews v. United Kingdom, [1999] 28 Eur. H.R. Rep. 361, 396, 32. In 1998, Sena-
tor Lines was fined by the Commission for an infringement of Articles 81 and 82 of the
EC Treaty. Requests by Senator Lines for payment of the fine to be suspended pending
the outcome of the appeal were rejected by the CFI on July 21, 1999 (Order of the
President of the CFI in DSR-Senator Lines v. Commission, Case T-191/98 R, [1999] E.C.R.
11-2531), and on appeal by the ECJ on December 14, 1999 (Order of the President of
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the interpretations of the EC Courts and the ECtHR would prob-
ably transform many of these delicate issues into moot questions.
Third, the ECJ explicitly left open the possibility that the
CFI erred in law in holding, by reference to Orkem, that decisions
under Article 11 (5) were illegal only in so far as a question
obliged an undertaking to supply answers leading it to admit
that there has been an infringement.'2 1
However, it is important to note that in Tokai Carbon &
Others v. Commission, 122 the CFI confirmed its previous finding in
Mannesmannr6hren-Werke that "[a] right to silence can be
recognised only to the extent that the undertaking concerned
would be compelled to provide answers which might involve an
admission on its part of the existence of an infringement which
it is incumbent upon the Commission to prove."1 23 The CFI also
restated its previous finding that the Commission "is entitled to
compel the undertakings to provide all necessary information
concerning such facts as may be known to them and to disclose
to the Commission, if necessary, such documents relating
thereto as are in their possession, even if the latter may be used
to establish the existence of anti-competitive conduct.'1 24  Fur-
the Court in DSR-Senator Lines v. Commission, Case G-364/99 PCR, [1999] E.C.R. 1-8733).
Senator Lines contended before the ECtHR that the requirement to pay the fine before
a decision was taken in the substantive proceedings was a violation of Article 6 of the
European Convention. The hearing in this case was cancelled in light of the judgment
of the CFI setting aside the fine imposed by the Commission on Senator Lines. See
Atlantic Container Line & Others v. Commission,Joined Cases T-191 & 212-14/98 (CFI,
not yet reported); see also Press Release, On the Cancellation of Hearing in the Case
Senator Lines GmbH v. the 15 Member States of the European Union (Oct. 16, 2003),
available at http://www.echr.coe.int/eng/press/2003/oct/senatorlinescancelled.htm.
On March 10, 2004, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR declared the application inad-
missible because "the facts of the present case were never such as to permit the appli-
cant company to claim to be a victim of a violation of its [European] Convention
rights." Senator Lines GmbH v. the 15 Member States of the European Union, [2004]
39 Eur. H.R. Rep. SE3.
121. See PVC II, [2002] E.C.R. 1-8375, 292.
122. Joined Cases T-236, 239, 244-46, 251, 252/01 (CFI, not yet reported). The
question of the privilege against self-incrimination arose in the specific context of the
assessment of the reduction of the fine from which SGL Carbon AG ("SGL") should
have benefited due to its cooperation with the Commission. See id. 11 410-11. SGL
argued that it had provided the Commission with information that it could have with-
held (because it was covered by the privilege against self-incrimination) and that ac-
cordingly it should have benefited from an additional reduction of the fine imposed to
it. See id. 382.
123. Id. 7 402 (citing Mannesmannr'hren-Werke, [2001] E.C.R. 11-729, 7 66-67).
124. Id. 403 (citing Mannesmannrdhren-Werke, [2001] E.C.R. 11-729, 65).
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thermore, the CFI considered that this power did not fall foul of
either Article 6(1) and (2) of the European Convention or the
case-law of the ECtHR, noting that in PVC II the Court had not
reversed its previous case-law in spite of Funke, Saunders, and JB.
v Switzerland.125
Accordingly, in Tokai Carbon the CFI explicitly restated the
principles laid down in Mannesmannrthren-Werke.126 One may
note, however, that when the CFI applied these principles to the
facts of the case, it seemed to take a broader view of the scope of
the privilege against self-incrimination. The CFI first considered
that the privilege applied to requests to describe the object of
and what actually occurred at those meetings. 127 More impor-
tantly, the CFI also considered that the privilege applied to cer-
tain types of documents related to these meetings (e.g., protocols,
working documents and preparatory documents, handwritten
notes, notes and conclusions, planning and discussion docu-
ments).12 As the Tokai Carbon case is currently under appeal, I
will not make further comments on this topic. 29
It is apparent from the description above that the scopes of
both legal professional privilege and the privilege against self-
incrimination have evolved over the years. These two privileges
also illustrate two different patterns of evolution: whereas legal
professional privilege is rooted in the national laws, so that its
evolution is mainly influenced by the evolution of these laws, the
privilege against self-incrimination is more influenced by the Eu-
ropean Convention. However, these patterns are complemen-
tary, as the European Convention also influences the national
125. See id. 7 404-06. The CFI further considered that "the mere fact of being
obliged to answer purely factual questions put by the Commission and to comply with
its requests for the production of documents already in existence cannot constitute a
breach of the principle of respect for the rights of defence or impair the right to fair
legal process, which offer, in the specific field of competition law, protection equivalent
to that guaranteed by Article 6 of the [European] Convention." Id. 406. The CFI
explained this stance by the fact that "[t] here is nothing to prevent the addressee of a
request for information from showing, whether later during the administrative proce-
dure or in proceedings before the Community Courts, when exercising his rights of
defence, that the facts set out in his replies or the documents produced by him have a
different meaning from that ascribed to them by the Commission." Id. (citing Mannes-
mannrhren-Werke, [2001] E.C.R. 11-729, 7 77-78).
126. See id. 7 402.
127. See id. 7 407.
128. See id. 7 408.
129. See Commission v. SGL Carbon AG, Case C-301/04 P (pending).
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laws that in turn influence EC law. Fundamental rights and,
more generally, rights in competition law are now shaped by a
complex and intricate set of mutual influences.
As explained below, the interactions between the European
Convention, EC law, and the national laws on competition inves-
tigations have been further complicated by the entry into force
of Regulation No. 1/2003.1°
II. THE IMPACT OF REGULATION NO. 1/2003 ON THE
APPLICATION OF LEGAL PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE AND
THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION UNDER
EC LAW AND NATIONAL LAWS
To put it simply, Regulation No. 1/2003 has revolutionized
the way in which information is now collected and used by the
Commission and the national competition authorities ("NCAs"),
which together form the European Competition Network
("ECN"). The generalization of exchange of information within
the ECN now makes it impossible to envisage EC and national
procedural laws in isolation, a principle that echoes vividly the
ECJ's statement in AM&S to the effect that "Community law...
derives from not only the economic but also the legal interpene-
tration of the Member States."' 131
This Section will first present an overview of the new en-
forcement scheme governing the collection, exchange and use
of evidence under Regulation No. 1/2003. Second, this section
will analyze how these powers may affect the application of legal
professional privilege and the privilege against self-incrimination
under Regulation No. 1/2003.
A. The New Legal Scheme Governing the Collection,
Exchange, and Use of Evidence
Before the entry into force of Regulation No. 1/2003, Arti-
cle 20(1) of Regulation No. 17 provided that information ac-
quired through investigations, inquiries, and requests for infor-
mation was to be used only for the purpose of the relevant re-
quest or investigation. 3 2 The Commission had to forward
130. See Council Regulation No. 1/2003, O.J. L 1/1 (2003).
131. AM&S Europe Ltd. v. Commission, Case 155/79, [1982] E.C.R. 1575, 18.
132. SeeCouncil Regulation No. 17/62, supra note 9, art. 20(1), O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed.
1959-62.
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certain pieces of information to the national authorities pursu-
ant to Article 10(1) of Regulation No. 17.133 However, in 1992,
the ECJ made it clear that competition authorities which re-
ceived information pursuant to Article 10 of Regulation No. 17
were not allowed to use that information as evidence in national
proceedings (even though they could use it as circumstantial evi-
dence in order to justify initiation of a national procedure).13 4
Furthermore, there was no general provision in Regulation No.
17 or elsewhere that organized or even allowed the circulation of
information between the national authorities.
Regulation No. 1/2003 changed this scheme radically by
making exchange of information a basic principle of the applica-
tion of EC competition law and generalizing the exchange of
information within the network. 135 Article 12(1) of Regulation
No 1/2003 reads:
[f] or the purpose of applying Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty
the Commission and the competition authorities of the Mem-
ber States shall have the power to provide one another with
and use in evidence any matter of fact or of law, including
confidential information.
136
Article 12 of Regulation No. 1/2003 further allows the use of
that information by the NCAs for the application of Articles 81
133. "The Commission shall forthwith transmit to the competent authorities of the
Member States a copy of the applications and notifications together with copies of the
most important documents lodged with the Commission for the purpose of establishing
the existence of infringements of Articles 85 or 86 of the Treaty or of obtaining nega-
tive clearance or a decision in application of Article 85(3)." Id. art. 10(1).
134. See Direcci6n General de Defensa de la Competencia v. Asociaci6n Espahiola
de Banca Privada & Others, Case C-67/91, [1992] E.C.R. 1-4785, 35-39.
135. See Council Regulation No. 1/2003, pmbl. 16, O.J. L 1/1 (2003). The Regu-
lation states in the Preamble:
Notwithstanding any national provision to the contrary, the exchange of infor-
mation and the use of such information in evidence should be allowed be-
tween the members of the network even where the information is confidential.
This information may be used for the application of Articles 81 and 82 of the
Treaty as well as for the parallel application of national competition law, pro-
vided that the latter application relates to the same case and does not lead to a
different outcome. When the information exchanged is used by the receiving
authority to impose sanctions on undertakings, there should be no other limit
to the use of the information than the obligation to use it for the purpose for
which it was collected given the fact that the sanctions imposed on undertak-
ings are of the same type in all systems.
Id.
136. Id. art. 12(1).
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and 82 of the EC Treaty and, in certain circumstances, of na-
tional law. 3 '
Accordingly, as Regulation No. 1/2003 did not harmonize
the national procedural laws applicable to the enforcement of
Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty at the national level,'1 8 the
new scheme gives rise to situations where evidence will be used
in a legal jurisdiction which is not the one where it was collected.
It has therefore become necessary to make a distinction between
the law applicable to the collection of information and the law
applicable to the use of that information.
1. Law Applicable to the Collection of Information
As regards the law applicable to the collection of informa-
tion, two straightforward cases must first be mentioned: where
the Commission or a NCA conduct investigations alone and for
their own account, it is clear that their powers are exercised
under EC law and the relevant national law respectively.
The issue becomes more complex when investigations are
carried out pursuant to Article 22 of Regulation No. 1/2003 by a
NCA "on behalf and for the account" of another NCA or "[a]t
the request of the Commission," since in this case the NCA acts
as the agent of another authority." 9 Article 22 of Regulation
No. 1/2003, however, provides clear guidelines in this respect.
It provides that:
* when a NCA conducts an investigation on its own territory
"on behalf and for the account" of another NCA, it does
so "under its national law;" 4°
137. See id. art. 12(2) ("[i]nformation exchanged shall only be used in evidence for
the purpose of applying Article 81 or Article 82 of the Treaty and in respect of the
subject-matter for which it was collected by the transmitting authority. However, where
national competition law is applied in the same case and in parallel to Community
competition law and does not lead to a different outcome, information exchanged
under this Article may also be used for the application of national competition law.").
In addition, under Article 5, national authorities can impose any penalty provided for
in national law (which may include criminal sanctions on individuals).
138. For a detailed account of the diversity of these laws, see THE MODERNISATION
OF EU COMPETITION LAw ENFORCEMENT IN THE EU, FIDE 2004 NATIONAL REPORTS (D.
Cahill ed., 2004).
139. Council Regulation No. 1/2003, art. 22(1), O.J. L 1/1 (2003).
140. Id. See also Paragraph 27 of the Commission Notice on Cooperation within the
Network of Competition Authorities, OJ. 2004, C 101/43, stating: "[t]he question
whether information was gathered in a legal manner by the transmitting authority is
governed on the basis of the law applicable to this authority."
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similarly, when a NCA conducts an investigation on its
own territory "[a]t the request of the Commission....
[t]he officials of the competition authorities of the Mem-
ber States who are responsible for conducting these in-
spections as well as those authorised or appointed by them
shall exercise their powers in accordance with their na-
tional law."141
A rule of thumb to determine the law applicable to the col-
lection of information is therefore that it is the law of the author-
ity conducting the investigation.
2. Law Applicable to the Use by the Commission or a NCA of
Information Collected in Another Jurisdiction
Article 12 of Regulation No, 1/2003 makes it possible for
the Commission or an NCA to receive and use evidence that it
could not have collected itself.14 2 The question therefore arises
as to what the receiving authority should feel entitled to do with
such evidence: must the authority disregard the evidence on the
ground that it would not have been allowed to collect it if it had
been located on its territory, or may the authority feel entitled to
use it?
Here again, a straightforward answer can be found in Regu-
lation No. 1/2003. Article 12(1) provides that "[flor the pur-
pose of applying Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty the Commis-
sion and the competition authorities of the Member States shall
have the power to provide one another with and use in evidence
any matter of fact or of law, including confidential informa-
tion."143 The general principle therefore seems to be that infor-
mation can be used by the Commission and the NCAs even if it
has been collected under rules that are less protective than those
of the Commission or the receiving NCA.1 44
There is also no doubt that the Council intended that, like
any other regulation, Regulation No. 1/2003 would supersede
national laws, as Recital 16 provides that the right to exchange
and use information applies "[n]otwithstanding any national
141. Council Regulation No. 1/2003, art. 22(2), O.J. L 1/1 (2003).
142. See id. art. 12(1), O.J. L 1/1 (2003).
143. Id. (emphasis added).
144. This possibility is grounded on the idea expressed in Recital 16 that "[t]he
rights of defence enjoyed by undertakings in the various systems can be considered as
sufficiently equivalent." Id. Recital 16, OJ. L 1/1 (2003).
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provision to the contrary. " 145
The only specific limitation to the principle concerns indi-
viduals. Pursuant to Article 12(3), the information exchanged
can only be used in evidence to impose sanctions on natural per-
sons where:
* "the law of the transmitting authority foresees sanctions of
a similar kind in relation to an infringement of Article 81
or 82... ;146
or, in the absence thereof,
* "the information has been collected in a way which re-
spects the same level of protection of the rights of defence
of natural persons as provided for under the national
rules of the receiving authority. However, in this case, the
information exchanged cannot be used by the receiving
authority to impose custodial sanctions."
4 7
The case of legal professional privilege, which has varying scopes
under EC laws and the national laws,'4 " exemplifies the practical
consequences of the scheme established by Article 12. Informa-
tion may have been collected by an NCA under a specific stan-
dard of legal professional privilege (e.g., France), and then for-
warded to an NCA in the jurisdiction of which the standard of
legal professional privilege is higher (e.g., the United King-
dom)."' The use of the information in the United Kingdom to
fine undertakings should be possible irrespective of UK stan-
dards. Indeed, the Office of Fair Trading ("OFT") has recently
indicated that "[w] hilst UK privilege rules would apply to cases
being investigated in the [United Kingdom] by the OFT on its
own behalf under national and EC law, the OFT could be sent
the communications of in-house lawyers . . . by an NCA from
145. This point is also recalled in Paragraph 27 of the Commission Notice on Co-
operation within the Network of Competition Authorities, O.J. C 101/43 (2004): "Arti-
cle 12 of the Council Regulation takes precedence over any contrary law of a Member
State,"
146. Council Regulation No. 1/2003,.art. 12(3), O.J. L 1/1 (2003).
147. Id., O.J. L 1/1 (2003). See id. Recital 16, O.J. L 1/1 (2003); see also Commis-
sion Notice on Cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities, O.J. C
101/43, 28(c) (2004).
148. For a recent and very detailed account of these laws, see the following CCBE
publication: John Fish, Regulated Legal Professionals and Professional Privilege within the
European Union, the European Economic Area and Switzerland, and Certain Other European
Jurisdictions (Feb. 2004), available at http://www.ccbe.org/en/comites/in-house-en.
htm.
149. See id. at 84-85 (France), 104-05 (UK).
20051 1205
1206 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 28:1179
another Member State where the communication of such law-
yers are not privileged. Under those circumstances, the OFT
may use the documentation received from the other NCA in its
"1150investigation.
Accordingly, the undertakings under investigation should
not assume that the standard of legal professional privilege of
the jurisdiction where the information is used will necessarily ap-
ply. What matters more is the standard applicable in the juris-
diction where the information was collected.
Regulation No. 1/2003 therefore sets the stage for a com-
prehensive interpenetration of the national procedural laws. It
must be stressed that it will not necessarily level down the na-
tional laws: nothing in Regulation No. 1/2003 prevents a Mem-
ber State from increasing the current level of protection granted
in its jurisdiction for the collection of evidence. It remains to be
seen, however, what incentives Article 12 will create for the
NCAs and whether their cooperation will somehow trigger some
kind of a spontaneous harmonisation of the national procedural
laws.
EC law, like the national laws, is not exempt from these po-
tential influences under Article 12 of Regulation No. 1/2003.
The following section will analyse whether Regulation No. 1/
2003 contains other provisions susceptible of directly affecting
the scope of legal professional privilege and the privilege against
self-incrimination under EC law.
B. The Direct Consequences of Regulation No. 1/2003 for Legal
Professional Privilege and the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination in EC Law
This Section analyses how Regulation No. 1/2003 may im-
pact on the scope of legal professional privilege and of the privi-
lege against self-incrimination under EC law.
First, with regards to legal professional privilege, the re-
sponse seems to be quite straightforward. The text of Regula-
tion No. 1/2003 does not refer to legal professional privilege.
Moreover, there is primafacie no reason to believe that the scope
of that principle under EC law should be affected by Regulation
No. 1/2003, as the latter affected neither the legal roots (i.e., the
150. Office of Fair Trading, Powers of Investigation, Draft Competition Law Guideline
for Consultation 19, 1 6.3 (2004).
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Member States' laws on that question) nor the rationale of legal
professional privilege.
The situation is more complex as regards the privilege
against self-incrimination. On the one hand:
* Regulation No. 1/2003 contains a "catch-all" recital stat-
ing that it "respects the fundamental rights and observes
the principles recognised in particular by the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Accord-
ingly, this Regulation should be interpreted and applied
with respect to those rights and principles."15'
* Recital 23 of Regulation No 1/2003 codifies the principles
defined in Mannesmannr6hren-Werke.152
Regulation No. 1/2003 therefore reflects prima facie the current
position on the privilege against self-incrimination.
On the other hand, as explained by the ECJ in PVC II, the
application of the privilege against self-incrimination closely de-
pends on the existence of an element of compulsion. 53 Accord-
ingly, the modification of the Commission's powers (i.e., its
means of compulsion) under Regulation No. 1/2003 potentially
affects the scope of the privilege. It is therefore necessary to de-
termine how it applies when these new powers are wielded.
The first Sub-section will present briefly the new investiga-
tion powers enjoyed by the Commission under Regulation No.
1/2003. The second Sub-section will then focus on preliminary
thoughts about how Regulation No. 1/2003 could impact on the
privilege against self-incrimination.
1. The New Investigation Powers Enjoyed by the Commission
Pursuant to Regulation No. 1/2003
During the adoption process of Regulation No. 1/2003,
most of the legal scholars' attention was focused on two features
of the new scheme of enforcement of EC competition rules: (i)
the creation of the ECN; and (ii) the move, in the application of
151. Council Regulation No. 1/2003, Recital 37, OJ. L 1/1 (2003).
152. Recital 23 reads: "[w]hen complying with a decision of the Commission, un-
dertakings cannot be forced to admit that they have committed an infringement, but
they are in any event obliged to answer factual questions and to provide documents,
even if this information may be used to establish against them or against another under-
taking the existence of an infringement." Id., Recital 23, O.J. L 1/1 (2003).
153. SeePVCII, Joined Cases C-238, 244, 245, 247, 250-52, 254/99, [2002] E.C.R. I-
8375, 1 275.
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Article 81 of the EC Treaty, from an ex ante notification and
authorisation mechanism to an ex post exception system.154 One
additional important aspect of the reform, which seems to have
been sometimes overlooked by the abundant legal literature on
Regulation No. 1/2003, was the substantial increase of the inves-
tigative powers enjoyed by the Commission. 155 This increase was
grounded inter alia on the idea that "[t]he detection of infringe-
ments of the competition rules is growing ever more difficult,
and, in order to protect competition effectively, the Commis-
sion's powers of investigation need to be supplemented."" 6
The Commission's powers were increased in several re-
spects: (i) first, as regards the collection of information;' 5 7 and
(ii) second, the fines attached to a breach of the duties triggered
by these powers.1 8
As regards, first, the collection of information by the Com-
mission, in addition to the power to send requests for informa-
tion similar to those previously provided for by Article 11 of Reg-
ulation No. 17,' the Commission now has the power:
* to take statements: "the Commission may interview any
natural or legal person who consents to be interviewed for
the purpose of collecting information relating to the sub-
ject-matter of an investigation."' 6 °
* "to seal any business premises and books or records for
the period and to the extent necessary for the inspec-
154. See Council Regulation No. 1/2003, art. 1, OJ. L 1/1 (2003).
155. There are, however, several articles dealing with the issues raised by the new
investigation powers enjoyed by the Commission. See, e.g., Mario Siragusa, A Critical Re-
view of the White Paper on the Reform of the EC Competition Law Enforcement Rules, in 1999
FORDHAM CORPORATE LAW INSTITUTE 273 (Barry Hawk ed., 2000); see also Ivo Van Bael,
Procedural Rights and Issues, in 2000 FoRDHAM COm'ORATE LAW INSTITUTE 377 (Barry
Hawk ed., 2001); Wouter P.J. Wils, The EU Network of Competition Authorities, the European
Convention on Human Rights and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, in EUROPEAN
COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 2002: CONSTRUCTING THE EU NETWORK OF COMPETITION Au-
THORITIES (Claus Dieter Ehlermann & Isabela Atanasiu eds., 2005); Laurence Idot, Le
nouveau systhme communautaire de mise en oeuvre des articles 81 et 82 CE (reglement 1/2003 et
projets de textes d'application), in 35 CAHIERS DE DROIT EUROPtEN 283 (2003). All deal with
the issues raised by the new investigation powers enjoyed by the Commission.
156. Council Regulation No. 1/2003, Recital 25, OJ. L 1/1 (2003).
157. See id. arts. 19-21, OJ. L 1/1 (2003).
158. See id. art. 23, OJ. L 1/1 (2003).
159. See id. art. 18, O.J. L 1/1 (2003). Under Article 17, the Commission also has
the power to carry out investigations into sectors of the economy and into types of
agreements. See id. art. 17, O.J. L 1/1 (2003).
160. Id. art. 19, O.J. L 1/1 (2003). See id., Recital 25, OJ. L 1/1 (2003).
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tion;" 161
" "to ask any representative or member of staff of the under-
taking or association of undertakings for explanations on
facts or documents relating to the subject-matter and pur-
pose of the inspection and to record the answers" (which
means that, contrary to previous case-law, these persons
can be heard on topics going beyond the documents at
issue); 162
* if certain conditions are met, to carry out inspections in
other premises than business premises, including private
dwellings. 
163
These powers are enhanced by the increase of the penalties (i.e.,
the means of coercion) that may be imposed on undertakings or
161. Id. art. 20(2)(d), O.J. L 1/1 (2003). See id. Recital 25, O.J. L 1/1 (2003) (spec-
ifying "[s]eals should normally not be affixed for more than 72 hours.").
162. Id. art. 20(2)(e), O.J. L 1/1 (2003). By contrast, Article 14(l)(c) of Regula-
tion No. 17 provided for the possibility to request oral explanations relating to the
books and records under examination, which was often interpreted as meaning that the
Commission had no general right of interview. See Council Regulation No. 17/62, supra
note 9, art. 14(1)(c), 0.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1959-62. For literature regarding the right of
interview before the entry into force of Council Regulation 1/2003, O.J. L 1/1 (2003),
see National Panasonic (UK) Ltd. v. Commission, Case 136/79, [1980] E.C.R. 2033,
15; see also CHRISTOPHER KERSE, E.C. ANTITRUST PROCEDURE 140 (4th ed., 1998).
163. See Council Regulation 1/2003, art. 21(1), O.J. L 1/1 (2003). Article 21(1)
states:
If a reasonable suspicion exists that books or other records related to the busi-
ness and to the subject matter of the inspection, which may be relevant to
prove a serious violation of Article 81 or Article 82 of the Treaty, are being
kept in any other premises, land and means of transport, including the homes
of directors, managers and other members of staff of the undertakings and
associations of undertakings concerned, the Commission can by decision or-
der an inspection to be conducted in such other premises, land and means of
transport.
Id. This extension was justified by the fact that "[e]xperience has shown that there are
cases where business records are kept in the homes of directors or other people work-
ing for an undertaking." Id. Recital 26, 0.J. L 1/1 (2003). Unlike commercial premises,
private premises are constitutionally protected in all the national laws. See Hoechst v.
Commission, Joined Cases 46/87 & 227/88, [1989] E.C.R. 2859, 17. As a conse-
quence, pursuant to Article 21(3), a prior authorization from a national court is always
necessary to carry out such inspections. In addition to the criteria laid down in Article
20(8), the national court must check "the reasonable likelihood that business books
and records relating to the subject matter of the inspection are kept in the premises for
which the authorisation is requested." Council Regulation 1/2003, art. 21(3), 0.J. L 1/
1 (2003). Article 21(4) specifies that the officials can enter the premises, examine the
records and take copies but they have no right to affix seals and/or ask any representa-
tive or member of staff of the undertaking or association of undertakings for explana-
tions on facts or documents relating to the subject-matter and purpose of the inspec-
tion and to record the answers. See id. art. 21(4), 0.J. L 1/1 (2003).
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associations of undertakings if they provide inaccurate or mis-
leading information. The Commission may now impose fines
not exceeding 1% of the total turnover of the undertaking con-
cerned in the preceding business year if intentionally or negli-
gently:1
64
• the undertakings supply incorrect or misleading informa-
tion in response to a request made pursuant to Article 17
(i.e., in the framework of an investigation into sectors of
the economy) or Article 18(2) (i.e., a simple request for
information) ;165
* in response to a request made by decision adopted pursu-
ant to Article 17 (i.e., in the framework of an investigation
into sectors of the economy) or Article 18(3) (i.e., a for-
mal decision requesting information), they supply incor-
rect, incomplete or misleading information or do not sup-
ply information within the required time-limit;166
" they produce the required books or other records related
to the business in incomplete form during inspections
under Article 20 or refuse to submit to inspections or-
dered by a decision adopted pursuant to Article 20(4)
(i.e., a decision ordering an investigation);167
* in response to a question asked in accordance with Article
20(2) (e) (i.e., a question put to representatives or mem-
bers of staff): (i) "they" give an incorrect or misleading
answer; (ii) "they" fail to rectify within a time-limit set by
the Commission an incorrect, incomplete or misleading
answer given by a member of staff, or (iii) "they" fail or
refuse to provide a complete answer on facts relating to
the subject-matter and purpose of an inspection ordered
by a decision adopted pursuant to Article 20(4) (i.e., a de-
cision ordering an investigation)68
Passing now to the relationship between these provisions and the
application of the privilege against self-incrimination, it must
first be remembered that one of the yardsticks against which
164. See Council Regulation 1/2003, art. 23, 0.J. L 1/1 (2003). Pursuant to Article
15(1) of Council Regulation No. 17/62, supra note 9, 0.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1959-62, fines
could range from 100 to 5000.
165. See Council Regulation 1/2003, art. 23(1)(a), 0.J. L 1/1 (2003). The under-
takings have the right not to reply to a request made under Article 18(2).
166. See id., art. 23(1)(b), 0J. L 1/1 (2003).
167. See id., art. 23(1)(c), 0.J. L 1/1 (2003).
168. See id., art. 23(1)(d), 0.J. L 1/1 (2003).
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such powers must be analysed is the existence of compulsion.169
Keeping in mind this criterion, it seems prima facie that the fol-
lowing situations could be distinguished:
* as regards statements taken pursuant to Article 19, it
seems that no privilege could be asserted by the natural or
legal person concerned, as the latter must consent to be
interviewed;'
70
* as regards simple requests for information made under
Article 18(2), the undertaking is not obliged to answer
and no fine is provided for by Article 23;171 the second
condition defined in PVC II being absent, the privilege
should probably not apply;
* as regards requests made by decision pursuant to Article
17 or Article 18(3), there is an element of coercion result-
ing from the possibility that fines may be imposed under
Article 23(1)(d); accordingly, the privilege could poten-
tially apply.
The situation is a bit more complex where "representative [s]
and member[s] of staff" are asked questions pursuant to Article
20(2) (e) (i.e., in the course of an investigation conducted pursu-
ant to Article 20), because in this case: (i) it is more difficult to
determine when compulsion actually weighs on the person ques-
tioned and/or the undertaking; and (ii) the person questioned
may or may not speak on behalf of the undertaking.
As a preliminary matter, it may be noted that, pursuant to
Article 23(1), procedural fines can be imposed only on under-
takings and not on individuals. 172 In particular, pursuant to Arti-
cle 23(1) (d), first indent, "[t]he Commission may by decision
impose on undertakings and associations of undertakings fines
169. SeePVCII, Joined Cases C-238, 244, 245, 247, 250-52, 254/98, [2002] E.C.R. I-
8375, 275.
170. Their protection is enhanced by Article 3(1) of Commission Regulation No.
773/2004, which provides that:
[w]here the Commission interviews a person with his consent in accordance
with Article 19 of Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003, it shall, at the beginning of the
interview, state the legal basis and the purpose of the interview, and recall its
voluntary nature. It shall also inform the person interviewed of its intention to
make a record of the interview.
Commission Regulation No. 773/2004, Oj. L 123/18, art. 3(1) (2004). See id. Recital 3,
O.J. L 123/18 (2003).
171. Pursuant to Article 23(1)(a), a fine may be imposed only if, having accepted
to answer the request, the undertaking provides misleading or incorrect information.
172. See Commission Regulation No. 1/2003, art. 23(1), O.J. L 1/1, at 16 (2003).
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... where, intentionally or negligently.., in response to a ques-
tion asked in accordance with Article 20(2) (e), they give an in-
correct or misleading answer. ' 17' Therefore, while under Arti-
cle 20(2) (e) questions are put to "representative [s] and mem-
ber[s] of staff"174 , the wording of Article 23(1) (d), first indent,
clearly shows that an undertaking may act or "speak" (and be
fined) in this context.
It must therefore be determined when the undertaking can
be held to have given an "incorrect or misleading answer"1 75
through a representative or a member of staff (and therefore be
fined). One possibility in that respect would be to transpose the
principles applicable to impute an employee's acts to an under-
taking in the context of a violation of Articles 81 and/or 82 of
the EC Treaty (i.e., the employee's acts are imputable to the un-
dertaking if the former is authorised to act on behalf of the lat-
ter) .176 That would mean in practice that the offense defined in
Article 23(1) (d), first indent,1 77 would be imputable to the un-
dertaking if it has been committed by a person authorised to
speak on its behalf. This principle seems indeed to be implicitly
reflected in Article 4(3) of Regulation No. 773/2004, which
gives the undertaking under investigation the possibility of recti-
fying, amending or supplementing the explanations given by a
member of staff "who is not or was not authorised... to provide
explanations on behalf of the undertaking." 17' The latter provi-
sion seems to suggest that, in certain circumstances, members of
staff may be authorized to speak on behalf of the undertaking.
173. Id. art. 23(1)(d), O.J. L 1/1 (2003).
174. Id. art. 20(2)(e), O.J. L 1/1 (2003).
175. Id. art. 23(1)(d), O.J. L 1/1 (2003).
176. See Musique Diffusion Franiaise & Others v. Commission, Joined Cases 100-
103/80, [1983] E.C.R. 1825, 97; HFB & Others v. Commission, Case T-9/99, [2002]
E.C.R. 11-1487, 1 275.
177. See Commission Regulation No. 1/2003, art. 23(1)(d), O.J. L 1/1, at 16
(2003).
178. Commission Regulation No. 773/2004, art. 4(3), O.J. L 123/18 (2004). Arti-
cle 4(3) reads in relevant part:
In cases where a member of staff of an undertaking or of an association of
undertakings who is not or was not authorised by the undertaking or by the
association of undertakings to provide explanations on behalf of the undertak-
ing or association of undertakings has been asked for explanations, the Com-
mission shall set a time-limit within which the undertaking or the association
of undertakings may communicate to the Commission any rectification,
amendment or supplement to the explanations given by such member of staff.
Commission Regulation No. 773/2004, art. 4(3), O.J. L 123/18 (2004).
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Conversely, since the undertaking under investigation is not
given the possibility to rectify the explanations given by "repre-
sentatives," it could be considered that the latter must normally
be deemed to speak and act on behalf of the undertaking.1 79
Assuming that the "authorisation to speak" is a correct crite-
rion to impute an offense to an undertaking in this context, two
situations could be distinguished for the application of the privi-
lege against self-incrimination. First, assuming that the person
answering the Commission's questions under Article 20(2) (e) is
authorized to act on behalf of the undertaking (so that the un-
dertaking is indeed "speaking"), an element of compulsion
weighs on the latter pursuant to Article 23(1) (d), first indent.
Since its statements could be relied upon to find an infringe-
ment of Articles 81 and/or 82 of the EC Treaty, it seems that the
privilege against self-incrimination could apply to the undertak-
ing. Accordingly, the undertaking's "mouths" would probably
be allowed not to make statements incriminating the undertak-
ing (assuming of course that the other conditions for the appli-
cation of the privilege are met). In this case, the question none-
theless arises whether the person questioned could assert the
privilege for his own account when he is requested to make state-
ments that would incriminate him under certain national laws
while not incriminating the undertaking. However, it seems
doubtful that such a situation will often arise in practice: an ad-
mission by a person who is authorised to speak in the name of an
undertaking to the effect that he personally participated to a
breach of Articles 81 and/or 82 of the EC Treaty will in most
instances incriminate the company itself (and therefore be cov-
ered by the latter's potential privilege).180
179. This principle would mirror the principle laid down in Article 18(4) of Regu-
lation No. 1/2003 according to which replies to Article 18 requests must be supplied by
"[t] he owner of the undertakings or their representatives and, in the case of legal per-
sons, companies or firms, or associations having no legal personality, the persons
authorised to represent them by law or by their constitution." Regulation No. 1/2003,
O.J. L 1/1, art. 18(4) (2003).
180. Should the situation nonetheless arise, it could be argued that an element of
compulsion sometimes weighs on the person under questioning: although formally
only the undertaking could be fined for a lack of cooperation, the conflict of interests
imposed on the person (i.e., the conflict between his duty of loyalty to the undertaking
and his own protection) could be considered to amount to actual compulsion. On the
other hand, individuals cannot be fined for a breach of the EC competition rules. Ac-
cordingly, no incrimination of these individuals can occur under EC law. As regards to
the possibility that the information will be later exchanged with NCAs and used in crim-
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Second, where the person questioned under Article
20(2) (e) is not authorised to speak on behalf of the undertak-
ing, it seems difficult to acknowledge the existence of a privilege
against self-incrimination, as there would be no element of com-
pulsion weighing on the undertaking and the natural person: in
particular, the natural person could not be forced to speak be-
cause no penalty could be imposed on him, as an individual, for
his lack of cooperation. However, the natural person would
probably enjoy a broader possibility to remain silent because the
Commission would have no way of obliging him to speak.
As a consequence, prima facie there seems to be fairly good
reasons to think that representatives or members of staff ques-
tioned under Article 20(2) (e) can refrain from making state-
ments incriminating the undertaking.181 Reality, however, re-
mains more complex than the imagination can foresee and it
will be the province of the EC Courts to settle this complex ques-
tion.
CONCLUSION
The very purpose of competition investigations is to create
an "element of surprise." That element undoubtedly remains in-
strumental for the preservation of the Commission's ability to
collect reliable evidence.1 1 2 However, the importance of sur-
prise to the discovery of truth must be balanced against the
inal procedures under national law, as explained above, based on the conditions set out
in Article 12(3) of Regulation No. 1/2003 (which lays down limits on the use of ex-
changed information), the NCAs concerned would probably be barred from using
these statements to impose criminal penalties on individuals, because (i) no criminal
sanction exists for individuals under EC law; and (ii) the evidence would not have been
collected in a way which respects the same level of protection of the rights of defence of
natural persons as provided for under the national rules of the receiving NCA (all the
Member States being parties to the European Convention, it is assumed that the Euro-
pean Convention standards preventing the self-incrimination of individuals would fully
apply under the national laws). Accordingly, it seems doubtful that the person under
questioning could assert any privilege in this case because in practice he could not be
sentenced on the basis of such evidence.
181. Prima facie the same principles seem to apply, mutatis mutandis, to the beha-
viour incriminated by Article 23(1)(d), second and third indents (i.e., when in re-
sponse to a question asked in accordance with Article 20(2) (e), the undertaking or
association of undertakings fails to rectify within a time-limit set by the Commission an
incorrect, incomplete or misleading answer given by a member of staff, or fails or refuse
to provide a complete answer on facts relating to the subject-matter and purpose of an
inspection ordered by a decision adopted pursuant to Article 20(4)).
182. SeeJoshua, supra note 48.
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probability that unlimited powers may lead the persons under
investigation (including innocent ones) to irremediably impair
their defense without necessarily contributing to the correctness
of the decision to be adopted. For that reason, the protection of
the rights of the defense against irreparable harm, a principle
whose scope encompasses both legal professional privilege and
the privilege against self-incrimination, should remain one of
the most pervasive limitations to the powers enjoyed by the Com-
mission during investigations. That limitation being general, it
remains to be seen whether in the context of Regulation No. 1/
2003 it will prompt novel limitations that were not necessary
under Regulation No. 17. Now, as in 1989, it is never too late to
wield the "big guns" of "constitutional" artillery.
